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This paper analyses the mobilization actions among Latino populations in the United States, especially 
Mexican and Central American immigrants, triggered by the passage of H.R. 4437 by the U.S. House of 
Representatives on December 16, 2005. I expose the actors, their rationale, and mechanisms of 
mobilization that have raised to a historical proportion the current U.S. immigration debate. From a 
theoretical standpoint, I develop an analytical framework that addresses these events within the field of 
political transnationalism. The empirical analysis includes three levels: from a macro-meso perspective, 
this work suggests that mobilization actions can be explained mainly through the involvement of the 
Catholic Church and immigrant-supportive organizations in 32 cities across the nation. From a micro 
perspective, this research suggests that faith, work and family are the triggering factors for Latinos and 
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On December 16, 2005, the United States House of Representatives passed the bill H.R. 4437 
titled “Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005.” This bill 
makes illegal presence in the United States (U.S.) a felony. The bill also requires the department 
of Homeland Security to construct a double security fence across several portions of the Mexican 
border; encourages local police to enforce immigration law; makes it a felony “to assist, 
encourage, direct, or induce to enter or remain in the country with knowing or reckless 
disregard” of the fact that immigrants reside in the country illegally; and imposes a maximum 
fine of forty thousand dollars per undocumented worker that an employer hires or that an agency 
helps to find work. Currently, between 11 and 12 million unauthorized immigrants are estimated 
to live on U.S. soil. About fifty six percent of Latino unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. are of 
Mexican origin.2 
 
This legislative action triggered the mobilization of millions of persons across the U.S. in the 
first half of 2006. The first major rally against H.R. 4437 took place in the city of Chicago, 
where a number between 100,000 and 300,000 individuals took to the streets on March 10, 2006. 
For the period March 11-April 7 the rallies expanded to 76 cities with an estimated mobilization 
of 500,000 - 900,000 persons. A number between 1.4 and 1.7 million people took to the streets in 
108 localities during the weekend of April 8-10. Finally, on May 1, a figure between 1.2 and 2 
million people participated in organized rallies associated to an economic boycott in 63 localities 
across the U.S.3 The high number of participants and the peaceful manner in which the rallies 
were held have no precedent in U.S. history.  
 
                                                 
1
 An earlier version of this work, titled “Political Mobilization of Mexican Immigrants in American Cities  
and the U.S. Immigration Debate,” appeared in D. Sujatha’s Immigration: International Perspectives, ICFAI 
University Press, Andhra Pradesh, India, 2007, pp. 13-41. 
2
  “Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the U.S. - Estimates Based on the March 
2005 Current Population Survey” by Jeffrey S. Passel, Pew Hispanic Center, March 2006. 
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf  
3
 Calculations from the author based on Xochitl Bada, Jonathan Fox, Elvia Zazueta and Ingrid Garcia’s “El 
levantamiento migrante en numeros,” MX Sin Fronteras, June 2006. The terms “Hispanic” and “Latino” are used in 
an interchangeable way in this work. 
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In this work, from an empirical perspective, (1) I address the causes and consequences of these 
mobilization actions by exposing the actors, their rationale, and mechanisms of mobilization that 
have raised to a historical proportion the current U.S. immigration debate. From a theoretical 
standpoint, (2) I develop a framework of analysis that addresses these events within the field of 
political transnationalism. Research for this work is mostly based on two major sources: the 
“U.S. Immigration Debate: Core Documents,” which includes more than 200 electronic links to 
documents related to the current U.S. immigration debate, that can be consulted in the website of 
the Mexico-North Research Network (www.mexnor.org); and the “Mexico-North Collection on 
the U.S. Immigration Debate,” which includes more than 900 articles from U.S. and Mexican 
newspapers, magazines and electronic newsletters about the immigration debate for the period 
January 2005 – July 2006.  
 
Theoretical Perspective: On Transnationalism 
The term “transnationalism” can be addressed from three different perspectives: as a notion, as 
an analytical framework and as a process or set of processes (Cano 2009). In this study, the 
working definition of the term starts with the notion of “being here and there at the same time.”  
 
Immigrants can be here (in the United States) and there (Mexico) at the same time through their 
family, their remittances, their religion or through political organization and mobilization, for 
example. The process of transnationalism becomes evident through a set of consecutive actions 
that take place “here and there” by an immigrant group, like increasing their mobilization 
capabilities and organizational skills through a series of events or actions in both sides of the 
border that directly affect the interest of the group. Finally, from a theoretical perspective, these 
actions, which are developed within the notion of “being here and there at the same time,” can be 
framed from an analytical standpoint within different disciplines in the social sciences: 
anthropology, sociology, economics, international law, political science, etc. The development of 
transnationalism as a concept is influenced by the methodological and theoretical background of 
each discipline.  
 
For purposes of this study, the term transnationalism is used within the theoretical and 
methodological context of political science, and the political mobilization and participation 
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perspective focuses on non electoral politics. Following, I offer a brief overview of Latino 
political mobilization and participation and political transnationalism in a context of urban 
politics. 
 
Mainstream literature on political mobilization and participation of the Latino population in the 
U.S. shares two aspects with its counterpart in American politics: the definition of the basic 
concepts, and the fact that contemporary research is focused mostly on citizens. There is, 
however, an increasingly growing literature in non-electoral politics of minority groups. In 
general terms, we understand ethnic political mobilization as “a process by which groups 
organize around some feature of ethnic identity in pursuit of collective ends” (Olzak 1983). 
Within this framework, we can see Latino mobilization as a process of connectedness that 
represents the action or actual result of interaction among two or more Spanish speaking groups. 
This process involves individuals and organizations and it leads to frequent interaction and 
mobilization as one homogenous, language population (Hannan 1979, Padilla 1985).  
 
Latino mobilization is the result of the interaction of three forces: structural (economic, social, 
political), cultural (sharing traditions, language and, for national-origin groups, national identity), 
and the existence or nonexistence of governmental and public policies (civil rights laws, equal 
employment opportunities, and affirmative action). In short, ethnicity is considered the basis for 
interest group mobilization (Padilla 1985, Enloe 1980), and ethnic mobilization cannot be 
perceived as occurring without a certain external stimulus.  
 
Also, based on Padilla’s study on Latino ethnic consciousness (1985), I infer that national-origin 
ethnic group formation (the Mexican case, for example) is the basis for the mobilization process, 
as it includes both, the cultural model, where ethnicity is inherited, and the social organizational 
model, where ethnicity is developed as an adaptive response to external forces rather than the 
manifestation of a preconscious driven force. Other important factors that are related to the 
emergence of national-origin ethnic mobilization are ideology (which may or may not contribute 
to unifying a single ethnic group, mostly if ideology is linked to the country of origin), class 
solidarity and actions, the role of leadership (Vigil 1987), and the role of national-origin 
symbols.  
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Garcia and de la Garza (1985) assert that citizen and noncitizen components of the Mexican-
origin population show very low rates of organizational involvement. They point out that the 
most important factors that contribute to a lesser organizational participation are: the lack of 
information about voluntary organizations or how to join them, low socioeconomic levels, time 
constraints, lack of organizational skills, low levels of educational attainment, low levels of 
English language proficiency, and an inadequate opportunity structure. They conclude that “if 
the non-citizen Mexican-origin residents are actively involved in community, labor, and other 
types of organizations, those affiliations could result in higher rates of political participation and, 
potentially, increased rates of naturalization.” 
 
In the early 1990s, the Latino National Political Survey (LNPS) was the first study to offer 
representative, aggregate data on U.S.-Latino constituencies, according to their national origin.4 
The overwhelming majority of studies generated by this survey had to do with all kinds of 
problems and issues related to Latino political participation and behavior. The LNPS study (de la 
Garza et al. 1992), and subsequent studies generated by it, focused mainly on citizens and 
offered some info about ethnic organizational behavior of noncitizens (in this case, Mexican 
immigrants, regardless of their legal status). However, the National Latino Immigrant Survey 
(Pachon and DeSipio 1994) offers more specific data on organizational activity of legal 
immigrants (naturalized or not) by national origin in the U.S. 
 
Other studies have addressed the issue of organizational membership and behavior, and the main 
conclusions point out the following: (1) Active membership increases political participation 
through a process of participant socialization (Diaz 1996). (2) Although Latinos may be less 
likely to vote, their non-electoral participation patterns are not much different for those non-
Latinos when socioeconomic differences are considered (Hero and Campbell 1996). (3) 
Mobilization variables appear to be the most consistent predictors of non-electoral participation 
(Wrinkle et al. 1996). (4) Although socioeconomic status provide the skills necessary for 
                                                 
4
 Although the most recent and comprehensive Latino National Political Survey was released in late 2006 by Luis 
Fraga, Stanford University; John Garcia, University of Arizona; Rodney Hero, Notre Dame University; Michael 
Jones-Correa, Cornell University; Valerie Martinez-Ebers, Texas Christian University and Gary M. Segura, 
University of Washington.  
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political activity of Mexican-origin citizens in California, the political context and the process of 
socialization determines how the skills will be manifested (Tam Cho 1999). (5) Latinos have 
mobilized around immigration issues, and that Latinos’ mobilization reflects their domestic 
policy rather than foreign policy concerns (de la Garza et al. 2000). (6) Mobilization provides a 
critical point of entry into the political process for predominantly immigrant groups, like Latinos. 
Lastly, (7) politically active social networks work for them as a bridge into the American 
political process (Hritzuk and Park 2000). 
 
Referring specifically to the essence of the term as a process, within the theoretical framework of 
transnationalism, a new consensus emerges among researchers when trying to distinguish this 
process from others that immigrants have lived through history, in which they have also related 
to their home-state. According to Portes (1999), things are different this time because, 
historically speaking, the number of persons that participate in the process is a large one in 
relative and absolute terms; because of the advanced status of international communications and 
technology; and because the cumulative and repetitive character of the process translate this type 
of immigrants’ participation in a “norm.” 
 
The publication of Nations Unbound, by Basch, Glick-Schiller, and Szanton-Blanc in 1994, 
throws on the table a comprehensive definition of transnationalism, which became quickly 
accepted by a growing cluster of migration scholars as a starting point in the theoretical 
development of the term, they define transnationalism “as the processes by which immigrants 
forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and 
settlement. We call these processes transnationalism to emphasize that many immigrants today 
build social fields that cross geographic, cultural, and political borders.” However, the authors of 
Nations Unbound recognize that several researchers were “moving in the same direction,” as 
early as 1979, with Chaney’s “people with feet in two societies.” Others would follow up in an 
independent way: Appadurai and Breckenridge 1988, Appadurai 1991, Gupta 1992, Kearney 
1991, Nagengast and Kearney 1990, Rouse 1989, 1991, 1992, etc. 
 
Since then, several authors have stated their position about the practical and theoretical 
development of the term in many directions, and through several fields within the social 
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sciences. M. P. Smith (1994) states that transnational political organization and mobilization take 
place at multiple levels, underscoring the struggle between the “global governance” agenda of 
international organizations and multinational corporations, and the “survival strategies” by which 
transnational migrant networks are socially [and politically] constructed. Portes (1996) argues 
that migrants use a “transnational space” as a way to avoid regulatory obstacles to their social 
mobility. To make his point, he points out that changes in the Mexican constitution to allow dual 
nationality would lead to the consolidation of a larger transnational community. In 1998, Smith 
and Guarnizo edited Transnationalism from Below, a collection of essays that addressed 
transnationalism from a theorizing perspective, in which the authors point out that the term 
indeed is a complex process involving macro and micro processes, that affect “power relations, 
cultural constructions, economic interactions, and social organization at the level of locality.” 
 
From a broader Latino perspective, Suárez-Orozco and Páez state that “transnationalism turns 
out to be a complex set of social adaptations,” and that these “transnational adaptations need to 
be systematically examined over time and across generations.” (2002) They also point out that 
Latinos are also becoming increasingly relevant actors with influence in political processes both 
“here” (the U.S.) and “there” (their home country), and emphasize the importance of the Spanish 
language in the process.  
 
Cano (2004a), in a comparative interdisciplinary study on transnationalism, asserts that the use 
of the term “transnationalism” has been transformed since the early 80s to a point in which it is 
practically impossible to sustain the broader sense of the term beyond its generic roots. The 
theoretical development of concepts like transnational politics, transnational religion, 
transnational crime, transnational identity, transnational media, transnational spaces, 
transnational human rights, transnational communications, transnational corporations, 
transnational feminism, transnational ties, transnational security, and transnational ruling class, 
are directing researchers on transnationalism to deal with the issue from its own theoretical 
perspective, with their own research tools and methodologies, which leads on its own to the 
formation and consolidation of the term within each research field/discipline. 
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Smith and Guarnizo (1998) state that transnationalism can be addressed from three perspectives: 
the micro level, in which the units of analysis are the individual and the family; the macro level, 
in which society, state politics, and the economy, are the units of analysis; and the meso level 
(intermediate), in which organizations are the main unit of analysis.  Rainer Bauböck (2003) 
offers an interesting insight into theory building within the field of political transnationalism. He 
also enforces the idea that political transnationalism is better understood if three levels of 
analysis are considered in the research from a political perspective: micro (i.e.: the individual, 
the family), macro (i.e.: the state, the polity, the society, the economy) and intermediate or meso 
(i.e.: organizations, institutions, the community). Moreover, Bauböck’s research suggests that 
there is a connection among these three levels, and he uses the macro perspective as the starting 
point for the analysis by distinguishing among international, multinational, supranational and 
transnational relations.  
 
The role and importance of immigrants within urban politics has been addressed mostly through 
scholarly work on race and ethnic minorities (Pinderhughes 1987, 1997; De Leon 1989; McClain 
and Stewart 2002; Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 2003), Political Machines (Ross and Levine 
2000, Harrigan and Vogel 2003, Judd and Swanstrom 2004), community empowerment (Torres 
1991; de la Garza, Menchaca, and DeSipio 1994), and neighbourhood politics (Clavel and 
Wiewel 1991, Bennett 1997), to mention the most relevant. Most of this mainstream literature 
focuses mainly on the citizenship and voting appeal of the immigrant community within a local 
analytical context.  
 
During the 1990's, academic research on transnationalism and globalization appeared in the 
urban politics scene. Most of these works address the transnational process of immigrants in 
New York City (R. Smith 1995, 1996, 1998; Foner 1997, 1999; Guarnizo, Sanchez, and Roach 
1999; Mollenkopf 1999; Cordero-Guzman and Grosfoguel 2000; Cordero-Guzman, Smith, and 
Grosfoguel 2001), and the dynamics of globalization and global cities (Sassen 1988, 1991, 1996; 
Robinson 2002). Literature in urban politics currently begins to incorporate the influence of 
immigrants and transnational processes into the political dynamics of city and metropolitan areas 
(M.P. Smith 1999, Judd and Swanstrom 2006, Cano 2004c).  
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This paper addresses the events of the first half of 2006 from a similar perspective, making 
strong emphasis on the connection among the three levels of analysis, and its main contribution 
to the development of the concept of political transnationalism has to do with different aspects of 
political mobilization, participation and organization of an immigrant community who lives and 
works in a host society in an urban political context. Indeed, this study encapsulates the essence 
of research on transnationalism: the basic notion of transnationalism is used as a starting point to 
analyze, within an analytical framework of political transnationalism, a characteristic 
transnational process: a political demonstration of millions of immigrants in a host country. 
 
Empirical Perspective: The Beginning 
Two weeks after the H.R. 4437 was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives, Cardinal 
Roger M. Mahony of Los Angeles wrote a letter to President George W. Bush, in which he 
voiced his opposition to the bill. Cardinal Mahony pointed out that “the bill imposes incredible 
penalties upon any person assisting others through a church or social service organization.” He 
stated that “one could interpret this bill to suggest that any spiritual and pastoral service given to 
any person requires proof of legal residence.” He added “Are we to stop every person coming to 
Holy Communion and first ask them to produce proof of legal residence before we can offer 
them the body and blood of Christ?” He expressed concern regarding the immediate 
consequences of the bill if becoming law: “In effect, priests, ministers, rabbis and other involved 
in various church-related activities will be forced to become ‘quasi-immigration enforcement 
officials.’”5 
 
Cardinal Mahony’s concerns were directly related to the whole infrastructure and mission of the 
Catholic Church regarding charitable assistance to the low-income population in the United 
States. The Catholic Charities network, founded in 1910 and currently structured by 1400 local 
agencies and institutions across the nation, provides emergency services to more than seven 
million people per year. These services include food, clothing, financial assistance, utilities, 
medication assistance, community-building, transitional housing, disaster response and 
temporary shelter services. The Catholic Charities network reported revenue of 2.7 billion dollars 
                                                 
5
 “Cardinal Mahony Launches Immigration Justice Campaign in Los Angeles,” United States Conference of 
Catholic Bishops, Migration and Refugee Services, document without date, June 18, 2006, 
http://www.usccb.org/mrs/cardinalmahony.shtml.  
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in 2000, and 90 percent of that amount was spent in these programs and services.6 Under a strict 
application of H.R. 4437, it would be practically impossible for the Catholic Church to verify the 
migration status of at least 7 million people on a permanent basis, let alone checking the 
migratory status of every churchgoer that receives Holy Communion every time that he/she 
attends Mass. If the church or associated institutions failed in verifying the migration status of all 
these persons, it could risk the incarceration of its personnel, and certainly the progressive 
destruction of the Catholic Charities network. 
 
During National Migration Week, on January 8-14, 2006, Cardinal Mahony announced the 
creation of a committee of local clergy and lay leaders who were involved in immigration reform 
and the protection of immigrant rights to carry out the national “Justice for Immigrants 
Campaign.” U.S. bishops and other Catholic organizations launched the campaign in May 2005. 
Indeed, full involvement of the Catholic Church in the U.S. immigration debate became 
imminent in January 2003 with the publication of the pastoral letter “Strangers no Longer: 
Together on the Journey of Hope,” in which bishops from the U.S. and Mexico called for a series 
of reforms to what the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) called a “broken 
U.S. immigration system.” Among the basic elements of an immigration reform, the USCCB 
supported: (1) a broad-based legalization of the undocumented; (2) a temporary worker program 
with appropriate worker protections, 3) changes to the family-based immigration system to 
reduce waiting times for family reunification, and 4) restoration of due process protections for 
immigrants.7 
 
On March 1, 2006, as the U.S. Senate considered an immigration reform bill, Cardinal Mahony 
stated that if the Congress makes it a felony to offer support to unauthorized immigrants “[the 




                                                 
6
 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (2003) “Catholic Information Project,” December, Washington D.C. 
7
 “Strangers No Longer: Together on the Journey of Hope: A Pastoral Letter Concerning Migration from the 
Catholic Bishops of Mexico and the United States” United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, January 22, 2003; 
http://www.usccb.org/mrs/stranger.shtml.  
8
 “The Gospel vs. H.R. 4437” The New York Times, March 3, 2006. 
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The Rallies 
After the Catholic Church stated its position on the matter, the first rally that mobilized more 
than 10,000 participants took place in Washington D.C. on March 6, with 30,000 protesters. The 
first major rally took place in Chicago on March 10. A figure between 100,000 and 300,000 
participants took to the streets against H.R. 4437 and asked for legalization of unauthorized 
immigrants. The high number even took by surprise the organizers, who had an initial estimate 
of no more than 50,000.  
 
Between March 11 and April 7, a number between 500,000 and 900,000 persons took to the 
streets in 76 cities. During the weekend of April 8-10, an estimate of 1.4-1.7 million people 
participated in rallies in 108 localities in the U.S. Finally, on May 1, an estimated 1.2-2 million 
people in 63 cities across the nation participated in rallies linked to an economic boycott. The 
rallies of April 10 and May 1 are historical in the sense that for the first time in the U.S. millions 
of people took to the streets in a peaceful way, simultaneously across the country.  
 
High levels of mobilization were observed in 32 cities across the country. Locations in which at 
least one rally was held with more than 50,000 participants (Table One, Group A, “Major 
Locations”) include: New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, Phoenix, San Diego, Dallas, 
Detroit, San Jose, Washington D.C., Seattle, Denver, Atlanta, and Fort Myers. Locations in 
which at least one rally was held with an estimated 10,000-49,000 participants (Table One, 
Group B, “Mid-size Locations”) include: San Antonio, Indianapolis, San Francisco, Austin, 
Memphis, Milwaukee, Boston, Nashville, Fresno, Oakland, Omaha, St. Paul, Bakersfield, 
Madison, Orlando, Salt Lake, Salinas, and Salem.9 Major locations averaged a total of four 
rallies per locality for the period March-May 2006; Mid-size locations averaged two rallies per 
locality.10 The chronology of this work shows the most important rallies and number of 
participants for the 32 cities.  
 
                                                 
9
 Figures of participants in rallies are averages of upper and lower bounds of estimates of participation by local and 
national mainstream media obtained from the “Mexico-North Collection on the U.S. Immigration Debate” and “El 
levantamiento migrante en números.” 
10
 “Major locations” (14 cities) and “mid-size locations” (18 cities) refer specifically to the levels of mobilization 
within each city for the period March-May 2006, and not to the size or population of the city or metropolitan area. 
Other 76 cities across the U.S. would be considered “minor locations” for having held at least one rally of 9,000 
persons or less for the same period of time.   
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At a first glance (Table One), large rally participation in localities can be associated to high 
proportions of Hispanic populations in large U.S. urban centers.11  The average total population 
size of a major location in terms of rally participation is 1.7 million; which is 3.7 times the 
average population size of mid-size locations. Hispanics or Latinos have a major share of 
population in both types of locations: 23.6% for major locations and 20.6% for mid-size 
locations versus 12.5% of Hispanic population in the U.S. From an overall perspective, two 
thirds of Hispanics are of Mexican or Central American origin, about half of the Hispanic 
population is foreign born, and the national ratio between Mexicans and Central Americans is 12 
to 1, although for the 32 cities this ratio is 8 to 1. For half of these 32 cities, more than 75% of 
the total Hispanic population for each city is of Mexican or Central American origin. Finally, the 
ratio of Central Americans who live in major mobilized locations compared to those who live in 
mid-size locations is 9.4 to 1, although this is explained mostly by the high concentration of 
Central Americans living in Los Angeles, New York and Houston. 
 
Within the 32 cities that show relatively high levels of mobilization, Table Two illustrates that 
the Hispanic population is younger, predominantly male, highly concentrated in terms of labor 
force and, for the most part, shows significantly higher ranks of poverty at a family level. 
Hispanic population in the 32 cities shows higher proportions of males over females (54%), 
although this is a national trend among Hispanics in the United States (51%).12 One third of the 
Hispanic population in these cities has not reached the voting age, whereas the same proportion 
for the total population in the 32 cities is about 25%. In major locations, the proportion of 
Hispanics in labor force averages 20.2%, in mid-size locations averages 18.3%, whereas the 
same figure at a national level is no higher than 11%. Finally, the proportion of Hispanic families 
                                                 
11
 Figures used in tables one and two are a general reference to real numbers about immigrants living and working in 
the 32 cities mentioned in this work. Firstly, this data was obtained from the 2000 U.S. Census, which implies that 
the number of Hispanics are underestimated because (1) of the tendency of Mexican and Central American 
immigrants to skip registration in the U.S. Census, and (2) the fact that unauthorized immigrant population in the 
U.S. has grown at least 2 million between 2000-2005 in accordance to Mexican authorities that track the U.S.-
Mexico border crossing. Secondly, these numbers refer to the total population in the cities, and not to the 
metropolitan areas in which a city can be located. Depending on the city, the immigrant population that lives in the 
metropolitan area can increase the numbers of rally participants (or the overall workforce) in an impressive way, i.e.: 
Fort Myers, FL, with a population of 48,208 registered a rally on 4/10/06 with an estimated mobilization of 75,000 
participants. In accordance to the Pew Hispanic Center, a total of 11-12 million of unauthorized immigrants live in 
the U.S., however, the actual number is unknown. 
12
 In accordance to the 2000 U.S. Census, the proportion of males for the whole U.S. population is 49.1%  
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below the poverty level is 22.6% at a national level; for major mobilized locations the average is 
34.9%, and for mid-size mobilized locations is 30.1%.  
 
Although socio-demographic indicators can highlight the profile of participants in the most 
important localities in terms of mobilization, the role of the Catholic Church is a major 
explanatory factor in the variations of participation in such locations for the whole mobilization 
process. From March 6 until April 10 the position of the Catholic Church against H.R. 4437 
suffered no alteration, although the church has always been clear about not supporting illegal 
immigration because “it is contrary to federal law” and because it exposes the immigrant to 
abuse and exploitation. Instead, the church advocates “changing a broken [immigration] law so 
that undocumented persons can obtain legal status… and enter the United States legally to work 
and support their families.”13  
 
During this period of time, the power of mobilization of the Catholic Church was fully displayed 
through the impressive numbers of the church’s nationwide structure and faith-based network 
that includes more than 63 million Catholics in the United States. This membership includes 
more than 19,000 parishes across the nation; over 40,000 priests and almost 80,000 religious 
brothers and sisters; more than 8,000 elementary and high schools with over 2.6 million students 
enrolled, and 230 Catholic colleges and universities.14 This infrastructure, and a major 
institutional interfaith networking effort, helped to spread the word about the problems that H.R. 
4437 represented to the immigrant community and also about the whole set of mobilization 
actions that would take place throughout at least 108 cities during this period of time. During 
2006, in accordance to the Pew Research Center (2007), 26% of Latino Catholics say their 
church participated in a protest or boycott; moreover, foreign-born Latino Catholics participated 
at a higher rate in a protest or manifestation than their native-born counterparts: 31% vs. 16%, 
respectively.   
 
In addition to the infrastructure of the Catholic Church, another important factor became 
essential for the successful mobilization of millions of people against the H.R. 4437: la confianza 
                                                 
13
 “Comprehensive Immigration Reform,” United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Migration and Refugee 
Services, document without date, June 18, 2006. http://www.usccb.org/mrs/mrp.shtml. 
14
 Catholic Information Project, December 2003. 
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(the trust). In order for mobilization to take place, the trust between the “mobilizer” and the 
mobilized is an essential factor to persuade the latter to participate in the mobilization. This is 
particularly true between the Catholic priests and their constituency, mostly that of Hispanics. 
Regardless of their migratory status, Catholic Hispanics in the United States highly appreciate 
and deeply trust the priests of their parish. Through this period of time the organizational 
backbone was the Catholic Church, and it showed its strength by initially supporting 
organizational efforts that took millions of people to the streets in well organized, peaceful 
rallies. Frequently, priests and other religious leaders rallied along with their constituency. 
 
It is also during the period January-April 2006 that the Senate prepared its own version of 
legislation to address the issue of illegal immigration in the U.S. Indeed, since May 2005 there 
were clear signs that no progress was made in building consensus between the House and the 
Senate with the introduction of the “Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act of 2005," a 
bipartisan, bicameral bill that considered legalization for unauthorized immigrants and the 
implementation of a guest workers program, in addition to a provision that addressed a national 
strategy for border security. This bill accentuated the differences on the matter not only between 
the House and the Senate, but also between Democrats and Republicans, and eventually between 
Republicans themselves in the House and the Senate.  
 
Polarization of positions among legislators first materialized with the House passing H.R. 4437 
in December 2005, which placed great emphasis on (Mexican) border-security and criminalized 
unauthorized immigrants without any chance of legalization or implementation of any type of 
guest worker program. The introduction of S. 2611 in the Senate by Arlen Specter (R-PA) 
confirmed such polarization on April 7, 2006. The Senate bill, which was approved on May 25, 
proposed strengthening border security, establishing a guest worker program, and providing the 
means for most unauthorized immigrants to become legalized and even achieve citizenship. At 
this point, President Bush favored the Senate approach within the U.S. immigration debate. 
 
For the period April 10-30, 2006, an informal network of hundreds of organizations across the 
U.S. made the call for a new peaceful rally at a national level and an economic boycott, both 
scheduled for May 1. Initially, the economic boycott included calls to walk-off jobs, perform 
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school walk-outs, and not buy or sell anything for 24 hours. In a later stage, calls were made in 
most cities to skip work only if the worker did not put his/her work at risk, and for students to 
join in the rallies after class. On April 16, Cardinal Mahony made a call for potential participants 
to avoid any type of boycott, not to rally, and to pray instead for the legalization process to 
materialize in the legislative process. The new position of the Catholic Church apparently was 
originated by the perception that the Senate, though the introduction of S. 2611, would neutralize 
H.R. 4437, and that sooner or later an agreement would be reached between both chambers on 
the matter without affecting the interests of the church. The criminalization of church activities 
with immigrants was no longer perceived as a feasible threat at this point. 
 
The new position of the Catholic Church was practically unanimous among the top hierarchy. 
Although most high-ranking church authorities did not pronounce themselves directly against the 
economic boycott or the rallies, they did not promote them neither. Most Archbishops and 
Cardinals offered Masses on May 1 on behalf of the immigrant cause (mostly legalization) at a 
time when most workers had already finished their work day. Mobilizations between April 10-30 
slowed to a halt; no rally of more than 3,000 participants was reported anywhere in the U.S. 
during this period of time.  
 
May 1, 2006: “A Day without Immigrants” 
Despite several Cardinals, along with President Bush and Senate leaders, stating that rallies and 
boycotts were not helpful to the cause, on May 1 a number of protesters similar to the April 10 
rallies took to the streets. The economic boycott became more noticeable in the West coast. 
 
On May 1 an estimated 1.2-2 million people took to the streets. This time, only 63 localities 
hosted rallies, a low figure when compared to the 108 participant localities on April 10. A major 
explanation for this is that the top hierarchy of the Catholic Church, in general terms, withdrew 
its support from the rallies. However, mostly in large cities, pro-immigrant organizations, some 
of them highly independent of the Catholic Church, had already created in matter of weeks a 
relatively solid network or set of networks that would drive a successful mobilization campaign, 
including advice to workers on how to negotiate with employers on their participation in the 
marches and what to do in case they get fired because of their job walk-off. Also in large cities, 
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similar to the April 10 experience, these networks of organizations would coordinate with 
Spanish-speaking radio stations to spread information about the rallies, the boycott and reasons 
to mobilize, and these broadcasts would contribute to a strong spirit of solidarity and confianza 
within the immigrant community about participating in the mobilization. 
 
In small cities the situation was different. The number of organizations that could advise a 
worker what to do if his/her job is threatened because of a probable walk-off definitely would be 
very low in comparison to the numbers and organizational and networking experience of large 
cities. In small cities, the formation of organizational networks depends more on the initiative of 
the local parish or religious-oriented/financed organizations. In these localities, if a priest did not 
consider it necessary to participate in the rally or the boycott, he would advise against such 
participation and no organizational meetings would even be held. After the rally of April 10 
many workers were notified by employers that another job walk-off could mean that the worker 
would lose his/her job. In a large city, if a worker loses his/her job, chances are very high that 
he/she could get another job in a relatively short period of time. In a small city, job offers would 
not be as easy to find.  
 
Spanish-speaking radio stations in small cities would broadcast information about the rally and 
the boycott, however, organizations and leaders would struggle more in financial terms to 
purchase mobilization ads in comparison to relatively well financed organizational networks in 
large cities. In large cities, some Spanish-speaking radio stations not only broadcasted 
information about the rallies and boycott, but the disk jockeys of certain radio programs became 
public figures that supported and promoted the actions, which proved extremely efficient in 
advising people what to do and what not to do during the protests. 
 
In short, on May 1, workers in small cities had more to lose by participating in rallies, the 
Catholic Church represented de facto a major demobilization force, organizational networks 
were relatively weak in terms of mobilization, and the Hispanic media was not as efficient as it 
proved to be during the April 10 rallies. In large cities, the emergence of large mobilization 
networks, mostly supported by organizations highly independent of the Catholic Church, and the 
important role of radio personalities compensated for the demobilization forces of the church.  
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Mobilization of Latino Immigrants 
At an individual level, the process of mobilization among Latino immigrants is better understood 
by considering the “mobilization axis” of the unauthorized immigrant in the United States: 
family, work and faith. In the whole process, whenever the leadership appeals to Mexicans and 
Central Americans to mobilize, the transnational component becomes an important explanatory 
factor to determine if the mobilization process can be successful or not. 
 
 The Catholic Church, a transnational institution on its own right, defends interests here (in the 
U.S.) and there (the Vatican) at the same time, based on a constituency that thinks and takes 
action based on a rationality of being here (in the U.S.) and there (in Mexico) at the same time. 
The link between the church (the institutional component of the transnational process) and the 
Mexican and Central American immigrant (the individual component) is twofold: the priest and 
his actions and the symbols that are used in the process: the flag of the country of origin and 
portraits of the Virgin Mary or other religious symbols.15 Immigrant organizations and the media 
also become an important factor of mobilization, but they play more a complementary role to the 
actions of the church. On their own, they could not mobilize the volume of people mobilized by 
the church, even if they try to use every transnational symbol at hand. The big difference in this 
process is the trust factor. The immigrant deeply trust orientations offered by the Catholic or 
Protestant Churches, whereas they trust in a moderate way the messages issued by immigrant-
oriented organizations or the media without an agenda linked to church sponsored actions  
 
In the last forty years, Mexican immigration to the United States shows strong economic roots. 
Mexicans decide to cross the border to get a job because their level of revenue in Mexico is not 
enough to cover the basic needs of their family: food, health and education. Once Mexicans cross 
the border, they do find work, otherwise they would migrate somewhere else. Mexican migration 
to the U.S. has been traditionally from rural, poor areas in Mexico to agricultural areas in the 
United States. However, during the last fifteen to twenty years, Mexican migration has expanded 
toward practically any destination within the U.S., rural or urban; and from any sending locality 
                                                 
15
 The figure of a Christ in the Cross is used by both Catholic and Protestant Churches. It is important to underline 
the strong capacity of the Catholic Church in the lobbying process for other denominations to participate in this type 
of movements. This helps to explain the participation of communities from Central American origin, which tends to 
be moderately influenced by Protestant Churches in comparison to the Mexican immigrant population, who is 
deeply Catholic.  
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in Mexico, also rural or urban. Mexicans migrate by the hundred thousands annually to the U.S. 
because of work and family. Regarding Central American immigrants, the population of war or 
political refugees is higher than those of Mexicans, although during the last 10-15 years, 
economic reasons have been the main engine of Central American undocumented immigration 
toward the U.S. 
 
The last time that the U.S. granted the opportunity of legalization to unauthorized immigrants 
was in 1986, through the Immigration and Reform Control Act. During the period 1986-2006, 
chances are very high that the average unauthorized immigrant now has family of his/her own 
and/or belongs simultaneously to a family “here” (in the U.S.) and “there” (back in Mexico). The 
approximate 3.1 million U.S. born children of unauthorized immigrants are, according to the 
U.S. Constitution, American citizens.16 The first mobilization incentive for unauthorized 
immigrants and their direct or indirect families in the U.S. is family itself. Family unification in 
the U.S. is represented in the rallies by Mexican and Central American flags waving along with 
American flags. The protester (U.S. citizen or authorized/unauthorized immigrant) is attending 
the rally because of the potential damage that legislation criminalizing unauthorized immigration 
can cause to his/her family. The flag of the foreign country represents the foreign born part of the 
family; the American flag represents the U.S. born part of the family.      
 
The defense of the workplace is the second powerful mobilization factor. Unauthorized 
immigrants and their families see the need to publicly manifest their disagreement with 
legislation that threatens workers with deportation because they were hired when they asked for a 
job. Moreover, deportation itself is a powerful disruptive factor not only for family life and its 
regular revenue flow, but for the individual that has been living in the U.S. for years, and who 
has practically no life “back home” once he/she is deported. In large American cities, mostly 
within non right-to-work states, the political consciousness of the magnitude of this problem is 
generally raised by community-based and workers rights’ organizations, regardless of the 
relationship of these organizations with the Catholic Church. 
 
                                                 
16
 Approximate figure disclosed by the Pew Hispanic Center in “Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized 
Migrant Population in the U.S.,” March 2006. 







Faith is the third and probably the most powerful mobilization factor of Mexican undocumented 
immigrants and their families. As explained above, the trust that exists between the Hispanic 
Catholic constituency and the priest is extremely influential. This may be explained by the 
transnational institutional origin of the Catholic Church. “Here” (in the U.S.) and “there” (back 
home) the church offers the same or similar spiritual comfort and assistance to its constituency. 
Moreover, when a twenty-five year-old immigrant arrives to the U.S., he/she may not know 
where he/she will work or stay initially, but he/she already has a spiritual baggage of about 900 
religious services in his/her heart and mind. When new immigrants arrive, and have no family 
already established in the U.S., chances are very high that they will start to adapt to the new 
environment through the use of temporary charity services offered by Catholic Church networks 
across the U.S. 
 
The relationship between the local parish and its constituency in the mobilization process is 
manifested in several ways. Some organizational meetings would take place in the parish or 
church-owned property; some organizations may be financed partially or totally by the church 
itself; sometimes the priest or religious-oriented leader is the one who takes the lead in creating 
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the network of organizations in charge of the mobilization, etc. At an individual level, it is the 
priest, through the Sunday services, that has the capacity to convince his whole constituency to 
mobilize or not for this or that issue. The average immigrant may perceive that his/her family 
and work may be threatened by a specific government action, but if he or she does not receive 
the “green light” of the priest, chances are very high that he/she will not consider mobilization 
seriously. The two major mobilizations of 2006 took place on Monday, which made relatively 
easy for priests to persuade their constituency to attend the rallies in a peaceful manner. Local 
organizations did the rest in terms of organizations of the rallies. 
 
The decision to participate in a mobilization involves simultaneous consideration of the three 
mobilizing factors. An unauthorized immigrant definitely wants to rally to defend his/her family, 
however, the act of participating in a rally may affect his/her family in a direct and negative way 
(i.e.: getting “deported on the spot”). Depending on the political culture of the immigrant,17 and 
to what extent the threat of getting deported is perceived as feasible, the immigrant weights 
whether or not to participate in a mobilization action. However, if the priest makes the call to 
participate, chances are very high that Mexican immigrants and their families will participate. 
The trust of the priest overcomes the immigrant’s mistrust of other organizations that make the 
call to participate or the fear that participating will affect in a negative way his/her own family. If 
the three engines act in a simultaneous way, millions of persons will take to the streets. The trust 
on the religious institution would be reflected in several ways: peaceful rallies, flags of religious 
symbols, images of the Virgin Mary and the crucifix. But most important of all: the priest, who 
will march, sometimes smiling, throughout the whole rally, shoulder to shoulder with his 
constituency. For the Catholic Church this only occurs if the priest is allowed by the top 
hierarchy of the church to do so, of course. 
 
                                                 
17
 For Mexican immigrants, for example, unions (sindicatos) could mean corruption and cooptation; for Central 
Americans union membership could mean government opposition and many times the main reason for which they 
emigrated from their home country. Even within Mexicans, community organization could mean several things: if 
previous experience is related to community organizations lead by Jesuit priests, the organization could mean high 
standards of service and commitment to poor communities along with high levels of political consciousness. If the 
experience is related to community organizations organized by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) during 
the 70 years of PRI-government, it could mean high levels of corruption and personal gratification for the 
leadership.  Levels of confidence on organizations that pursue political mobilization of unauthorized immigrants in 
the U.S. vary in accordance of the political culture of the immigrant. 
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From early March until mid-April, millions of unauthorized immigrants and their families 
impressively took to the streets peacefully in more than 100 cities throughout the U.S. The 
initiative of the Catholic Church served as a major trigger for the rallies and boycott of May 1, 
through which the organizational structure of non-religious organizations was strong enough to 
replace the original impetus of the church to mobilize people, mostly in major and mid-size 
locations. Priests also participated in rallies, but not in the same numbers than they did on April 
10, and they definitely stopped making calls for mobilization after May 1. From May 2 to July 
31, only Chicago would organize a major pro-legalization rally (July 19, 10,000 participants) in 
the U.S. This time, the Catholic Church exerted its power over its constituency mostly by doing 
nothing, and the other meaningful actors in the process, the immigrant-related organizations and 
the media, could do nothing about it. The rallies arrived to an end once the Catholic Church got 
totally convinced that its interests were not threatened anymore by the U.S. political system. 
 
Two Years after the Rallies… 
After the Senate passed S. 2611 in late May 2006, expectations were high that the House and 
Senate would reach a feasible commitment on a comprehensive immigration reform through a 
conference committee that would work out the differences in the two bills (H.R. 4437 and S. 
2611). However, in an unusual action, the House decided on June 20 to hold a series of public 
hearings on the matter across the nation. The Senate also decided to have its own hearings. Since 
July, after President Bush signals public opinion that he is open to prioritize an enforcement-first 
approach, there seems to be consensus in Washington, mostly among Republican members of 
Congress and the Executive branch, that border security programs should be given priority over 
guest worker programs and over any legalization options for unauthorized immigrants. Indeed, 
the only legislation that was enacted by the Congress was the Secure Fence Act of 2006, which 
became law in October and authorized the construction of new infrastructure along the border 
with Mexico.  
 
In March 2007, House Representatives Luis Gutierrez (D-IL) and Jeff Flake (R-AZ) introduced 
the Strive Act; Senators Ted Kennedy (D-MA) and Jon Kyl (R-AZ), working with Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Michael Chertoff and Commerce Secretary Carlos 
Gutierrez, negotiated a new immigration bill that was introduced in late May in the Senate.  The 
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House bill “would have strengthened border security, eliminated the backlog of family 
immigration applications, created a guest worker program, and provided legalization only for 
unauthorized immigrants who first left the country and paid fines, fees, and back taxes as a 
condition for returning legally.” The Senate bill “would have significantly boosted enforcement 
of immigration laws, created a new temporary worker program, eliminated family immigration 
backlogs, instituted a points system, and allowed most of the country's 12 million unauthorized 
immigrants to earn legal status.”18 At the end of the year, none of these two bills were enacted. In 
fact, the responsibility to enact any type of immigration reform at a federal level was passed to a 
new Democratic-dominated Congress and to the brand new President in 2009, Barack Obama.  
 
During the last two years of the Bush administration, the workplace raids have stepped up as an 
alternative but solid response to the lack of actions by the legislative branch. Also, as a direct 
consequence of the federal collapse to deal with immigration-reform legislation, state and city 
governments began to take immigration issues into their hands.  Up to December 2007, about 90 
localities have proposed anti-immigrant ordinances and, in most cases, they face uphill legal 
battles once legislation is passed.19 At a state level, immigrant-related legislation has showed an 
all-time high: in 2005, approximately 300 bills were introduced and 45 passed state legislatures; 
whereas in the first semester of 2008 alone, 1267 bills have been considered and 175 laws and 
resolutions have been passed by legislatures (see Table Three).  Recent enacted laws are mostly 
related to identification/licenses, employment, public benefits and law enforcement.20 Certainly, 
not all local or state legislation is anti-immigrant: California legislation prohibited its localities to 
enact laws which could prevent to hire or rent a place to live to undocumented aliens and New 
Haven Conn. and San Francisco Ca. opted to provide ID cards to all their residents, regardless of 




                                                 
18
 “The Failure of U.S. Immigration Reform,” Migration Policy Institute, Migration Information Source, December 
2007. http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=659   
19
 “US Cities Face Legal Challenges, and All 50 States Try Their Hand at Making Immigration-related Laws,” 
Migration Policy Institute, Migration Information Source, December 2007. 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=654  
20
 National Conference of State Legislatures, Reports on State Immigration Legislation 2007 and 2008. 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/immig/index.htm  
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Table 3 
Increase of State Immigration Legislation 
Year Number of 
Introduced Bills 
Number of Enacted 
Laws 
Number of States in 
which Legislative 
Action Took Place 
2005 300 38 25 
2006 570 84 32 
2007 1562 240 50 
2008 (January-June) 1267 175 39 
Source: Recompilation of the author based on data from the National Conference of State Legislatures, Reports on 
State Immigration Legislation 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008. http://www.ncsl.org/programs/immig/index.htm  
 
 
2006 was an electoral year in which the economy, the Iraq war and illegal immigration were 
three of the most important issues for the American electorate.21  2008 was a presidential 
electoral year and the economy, the Iraq war and healthcare became the most important issues 
for the electorate as a whole. Some scholars assert that the issue of immigration did not appear to 
play an important role in the 2006 midterm elections (Leal et al. 2008); however, in 2008 the 
issue still is important for the Latino electorate, mostly for that of Mexican and Central American 
origin, which have family whose migratory status is illegal. Although, more specifically, Latino 
voters identified education, the cost of living, jobs and healthcare as priority issues well ahead 
illegal immigration and the Iraq war.22 Finally, in July 2006, sixty three percent of the Latino 
population had the perception that the mobilizations of the first half of 2006 was the beginning of 
a “new and lasting social movement;”23 whereas in November 2007, sixty four percent of 
Latinos believed the immigration debate had made life more difficult for them.24 
 
The organized presence of Latino immigrants in large cities; the considerable input of Latino 
immigrants into the composition of the urban (and rural, seasonal) work force; and the potential 
and powerful support that the Catholic Church may exert to mobilize immigrants whenever its 
                                                 
21
 The Tarrance Group, July 9-13, 2006; Washington Post-ABC News Poll, June 22-25, 2006. 
22
 Pew Hispanic Center, 2008 National Survey of Latinos: Hispanic Voter Attitudes, June 9 – July 13. 
23
 Pew Hispanic Center, 2006 National Survey of Latinos, July 3-5, 2006; New Democrat Network – Latin Insights 
Poll, June 24 – July 1. 
24
 Pew Hispanic Center, 2007 National Survey of Latinos: As Illegal Immigration Issue Heats Up, Hispanics Feel a 
Chill, October 3 – November 9. 
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interests are threatened by new legislation on immigration are essential factors that must be 
considered by the U.S. Congress when addressing legislative proposals on immigration. The 
current immigration debate is not only about immigration itself or immigration quotas, border 
security in the U.S. borders or ports of entry, nor only about the costs and benefits of 
immigration to the U.S. economy; it is also and mostly about a flawed immigration system that 
allowed millions of people to work and live in a country for years without proper authorization. 
Although these immigrants have become an important component of a vibrant economy for more 
than 40 years, and they generate family who are U.S. citizens by constitutional standards, such 
individuals are threatened of being deported and criminalized because of the fact that they asked 
for a job, the job was granted to them, and they went to work on a daily basis. Things certainly 
will head for the worst for Latino immigrants as economic hardship becomes the daily news for 
everyday America.  
 
Current legislation on immigration has produced a second class of American citizens de facto, 
citizens of the city, indeed. The legislative and executive branches of government in 2009 have 
the historical responsibility to fix a broken immigration system. Short term or locally-based 
solutions, based on electoral calculations or enacting solutions with no practical application will 
only increase the dimension of the problem. The political and social fabric between Latinos and 
Anglos in American society can reach its limits if no permanent, pragmatic, national-level 
solution is reached.  
 
Final Remarks 
The most important contribution of this study to the development of ethnic political mobilization 
is the consideration of transnational factors in the process of individual mobilization of an 
immigrant group. As it was stated through this work, within the process of effective immigrant 
mobilization, the importance of faith, work and family arises in function of their transnational 
origin. This is reflected through the fact that Mexican and Central American immigrants are 
influenced by a context that is developed here, in the U.S., and has consequences there, in 
Mexico and Central America, whenever weighting to participate in any political mobilization 
action. Family, faith and work are the main engines of mobilization and participation among 
immigrants and the three engines have a clear transnational component: family could be affected 
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here and there if the source of income is threatened here. Immigrants work here in order to send 
remittances back there, to their country of origin. However, faith, a mobilization engine that 
works here because it started to work back there, even years before emigration took place, 
becomes the most powerful component of the mobilization and participation process. 
Trasnational symbols certainly helps the process to become more efficient. 
 
At a macro level, an important conclusion of this work is that the interaction between local and 
transnational politics explains different levels of empowerment of the home community in the 
host society. The Catholic Church decides to defend itself from an aggressive legislative branch 
and mobilization of immigrants take place. Two states, the Vatican (a transnational state) and the 
United States (the local force), measure the muscle of their political power vis a vis each other, 
and an immigrant population (from a different foreign state –Mexico and Central American 
countries) deal with the consequences.  
 
At a meso level, from an organizational perspective, local organizations definitely are an 
important factor of mobilization and they tend to use the same engines that lead their 
constituency to major levels of political mobilization and participation. However, those 
organizations that are not linked to faith issues are in clear disadvantage to those that are related 
to the church. Moreover, regardless of their faith-based orientation, all these organizations do not 
count with the same levels of trust among immigrants when compared to ecclesiastic levels of 
confianza showed by the Latino immigrant constituency. Immigrant-related organizations 
become a strong complement of church-led political mobilization and the media definitely plays 
a solid complement to both. But organizations and media on their own are incapable of initiating 
and sustaining an effective mobilization of millions of Mexican and Central American 
immigrants, at least for church-led mobilizations standards. 
 
The inclusion of transnational perspectives from a comparative standpoint becomes essential to 
explain different levels of empowerment among different immigrant communities in a city, 
group of cities or U.S. states. On the one hand, the comparative study of Mexican and Central 
American immigrants can take place within the political contexts of states that show strong 
concentrations of the targeted populations: California, Texas, New York and Virginia for 
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immigrants from El Salvador; California, New York, Florida and Texas for immigrants from 
Guatemala, Nicaragua and Honduras; and California, Texas, Illinois and Arizona for Mexican 
immigrants. On the other hand, the political actions of these groups can be analyzed through the 
political influence of family, faith and work on their organizational behavior, “here and there, at 
the same time.” 
 
Moreover, the study of “transnational urbanism” (M.P. Smith 1999) deserves more attention on 
the part of political scientists. The study of the interaction between local and transnational 
politics around an immigrant constituency has a promising future within the fields of the 
structure of city politics, regime politics, urban planning and development, urban administration 
and budgeting, the political dynamics of urban and metropolitan areas, studies of municipal 
productivity, community values, the relationship between City Councils and City Hall, and the 
role of the foreign born labor factor in the economic and political development of global cities. 
 
Finally, future research should address specific issues on the matter. For example, to what extent 
unions in the United States have (or will have) a strong and decisive influence in the 
mobilization and participation of Latino immigrants; to what extent class differences affect the 
mobilization dynamics among Latino immigrants; or to what extent religious tradition plays a 
critical role in the formation of alliances between Central American and Mexicans in the United 
States: in accordance to the Pew Reseaech Center (2007), 74% of Mexican-origin Hispanics are 
Catholics and only 2% are evangelical, whereas the respective numbers for Central Americans 

























% Hispanics / 
Total Population
% Mexicans + 
CA / Hispanics
% Hispanics 





New York, NY 8,008,278 2,160,554 186,872 99,099 285,971 27.0 13.2 31.0 5 3/25; 3/26; 4/1; 4/10; 5/1
Los Angeles, CA 3,694,820 1,719,073 1,091,686 238,191 1,329,877 46.5 77.4 63.8 9
3/24; 3/25; 3/26; 3/27; 3/28; 
3/31; 4/06; 4/10; 5/1
Chicago, IL 2,896,016 753,644 530,462 23,339 553,801 26.0 73.5 54.6 2 3/10; 5/1
Houston, TX 1,953,631 730,865 527,442 60,642 588,084 37.4 80.5 71.2 4 3/25; 3/27; 4/10; 5/1
Phoenix, AZ 1,321,045 449,972 375,096 6,085 381,181 34.1 84.7 78.5 5 3/24; 3/27; 3/28; 4/10; 5/1
San Diego, CA 1,223,400 310,752 259,219 5,077 264,296 25.4 85.1 42.9 7
3/27; 3/28; 3/29; 3/30; 3/31; 
4/9; 5/1
Dallas, TX 1,188,580 422,587 350,491 14,972 365,463 35.6 86.5 80.0 5 3/25; 3/26; 3/27; 3/28; 4/9
Detroit, MI 951,270 47,167 33,143 869 34,012 5.0 72.1 38.4 3 4/9; 4/10; 5/1
San Jose, CA 894,943 269,989 221,148 7,390 228,538 30.2 84.6 34.3 2 4/10; 5/1
Washington, D.C 572,059 44,953 5,098 15,803 20,901 7.9 46.5 39.3 3 3/6; 3/27; 4/10
Seattle, WA 563,374 29,719 17,886 1,987 19,873 5.3 66.9 12.5 2 4/10; 5/1
Denver, CO 554,636 175,704 120,664 1,997 122,661 31.7 69.8 69.4 4 3/25; 4/10; 4/19; 5/1
Atlanta, GA 416,474 18,720 12,715 796 13,511 4.5 72.2 42.2 3 3/24; 4/10; 5/1
Fort Myers, FL 48,208 6,984 2,588 670 3,258 14.5 46.6 39.4 2 2/22; 4/10
Average 1,734,767 510,049 266,751 34,066 300,816 23.6 68.5 49.8 4.0
Group B: Mid-size 
Locations
San Antonio, TX 1,144,646 671,394 473,420 3,492 476,912 58.7 71.0 78.4 2 4/10; 5/1
Indianapolis, IN 781,870 30,636 21,053 1,770 22,823 3.9 74.5 42.9 1 4/10
San Francisco, CA 776,733 109,504 48,935 23,367 72,302 14.1 66.0 20.4 3 3/26; 4/23; 5/1
Austin, TX 656,562 200,579 153,868 4,290 158,158 30.5 78.9 64.6 1 4/10
Memphis, TN 650,100 19,317 14,087 865 14,952 3.0 77.4 43.2 1 4/10
Milwaukee, WI 596,974 71,646 43,300 1,212 44,512 12.0 62.1 50.7 2 3/23; 5/1
Boston, MA 589,141 85,089 4,126 11,532 15,658 14.4 18.4 24.1 2 3/27; 4/10
Nashville-Davidson, 
TN 545,524 25,774 16,082 2,563 18,645 4.7 72.3 38.1 1 3/29
Fresno, CA 427,652 170,520 144,772 1,571 146,343 39.9 85.8 55.4 4 3/31; 4/5; 4/10; 5/1
Oakland, CA 399,484 87,467 65,094 6,759 71,853 21.9 82.1 46.1 2 4/10; 5/1
Omaha, NE 390,007 29,397 23,290 1,369 24,659 7.5 83.9 53.2 2 4/10; 5/1
St. Paul, MN 287,151 22,715 16,565 1,137 17,702 7.9 77.9 21.2 2 4/9; 4/10
Bakersfield, CA 247,057 80,170 64,700 1,964 66,664 32.5 83.2 68.5 4 3/29; 3/31; 4/10; 5/1
Madison, WI 208,054 8,512 5,164 452 5,616 4.1 66.0 21.7 2 4/10; 5/1
Orlando, FL 185,951 32,510 2,279 1,183 3,462 17.5 10.6 37.8 2 4/9; 5/1
Salt Lake, UT 181,743 34,254 25,430 1,041 26,471 18.8 77.3 54.7 2 4/9; 4/10
Salinas, CA 151,060 96,880 84,815 661 85,476 64.1 88.2 87.1 1 5/1
Salem, OR 136,924 19,973 16,636 310 16,946 14.6 84.8 63.3 3 4/9; 4/10; 5/1
Average 464,257 99,797 67,979 3,641 71,620 20.6 70.0 48.4 2.1
Ratio A/B 3.7 5.1 3.9 9.4 4.2 1.9
United States 281,421,906 35,305,818 20,640,711 1,686,937 22,327,648 12.5 63.2 45.5
Group A: Locations in which at least one rally was held with 50,000 or more participants.                 Group B: Locations in which at least one rally was held with 10,000 - 49,000 participants.
TABLE 1
Sources: Author's estimates based on (1) U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Demographic Profile Highlights, Fact Sheets for several ethnic groups; (2) the “Mexico-North Collection on the U.S. Immigration Debate;” and (3) Xochitl Bada et al.,  “El levantamiento 
migrante en números,” MX Sin Fronteras    Magazine, June 2006. Averages were rounded.
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New York, NY 48.2 30.6 24.2 23.3 41.2 5
Los Angeles, CA 51.0 35.5 26.6 40.1 64.3 9
Chicago, IL 52.1 35.3 26.2 22.6 26.6 2
Houston, TX 52.8 34.8 27.5 32.2 49.5 4
Phoenix, AZ 52.9 39.4 28.9 26.3 62.1 5
San Diego, CA 49.7 36.1 24.0 20.4 50.5 7
Dallas, TX 55.1 35.6 26.6 29.9 46.1 5
Detroit, MI 54.3 35.9 31.1 4.8 4.8 3
San Jose, CA 52.0 34.5 26.4 26.2 45.8 2
Washington, D.C 52.6 25.4 20.1 8.1 7.6 3
Seattle, WA 55.4 26.0 15.6 5.0 10.9 2
Denver, CO 53.0 34.2 22.0 25.0 57.5 4
Atlanta, GA 62.8 21.5 22.3 5.0 3.2 3
Fort Myers, FL 58.1 32.2 26.3 13.3 18.8 2
Average 53.6 32.6 24.8 20.2 34.9 4.0
Group B:   Mid-size 
Locations
San Antonio, TX 48.5 33.0 28.5 53.8 78.7 2
Indianapolis, IN 58.5 31.4 25.7 3.8 5.8 1
San Francisco, CA 52.8 22.6 14.5 12.4 18.7 3
Austin, TX 53.6 31.8 22.5 26.8 54.2 1
Memphis, TN 63.6 28.6 27.9 3.2 2.3 1
Milwaukee, WI 53.1 39.3 28.6 10.2 15.2 2
Boston, MA 49.1 32.7 19.8 11.5 30.6 2
Nashville-Davidson, 
TN 61.2 28.3 22.1 4.7 7.8 1
Fresno, CA 50.8 39.8 32.9 36.4 52.8 4
Oakland, CA 53.6 34.5 25.0 18.2 22.2 2
Omaha, NE 55.8 37.1 25.6 6.3 12.1 2
St. Paul, MN 54.0 38.6 27.1 6.7 10.1 2
Bakersfield, CA 50.3 41.6 32.7 28.7 46.7 4
Madison, WI 55.7 28.7 17.9 3.8 11.6 2
Orlando, FL 49.3 28.0 22.0 15.3 22.7 2
Salt Lake, UT 54.8 35.8 23.6 14.9 36.4 2
Salinas, CA 53.7 38.1 32.0 60.4 82.7 1
Salem, OR 57.0 40.5 25.4 12.6 30.3 3
Average 54.2 33.9 25.2 18.3 30.1 2.1
United States 51.4 35.0 25.7 10.7 22.6
Sources: Author's estimates based on (1) U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Demographic Profile Highlights, Fact Sheets for several ethnic groups; (2) the “Mexico-North 
Collection on the U.S. Immigration Debate;” and (3) Xochitl Bada et al.,  “El levantamiento migrante en números,” MX Sin Fronteras Magazine, June 2006. Averages were 
rounded.
TABLE 2
Group A: Locations in which at least one rally was held with 50,000 or more participants.
Group B: Locations in which at least one rally was held with 10,000 - 49,000 participants.
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Political Mobilization of Latino Immigrants in American Cities  
and the U.S. Immigration Debate 
 
CHRONOLOGY 
January 2005 - July 2006 
 
2005  
26-Jan * The “REAL ID Act of 2005” (H.R. 418) is introduced in the House by Rep. F. 
James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) 
10-Feb * The “REAL ID Act of 2005” passes in the House 
4-May * Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX) introduces the “Save America Comprehensive 
Immigration Act of 2005” (H.R. 2092) in the House 
12-May * “Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act of 2005” (S. 1033/H.R. 2330) is 
introduced in the Senate by Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and Edward M. 
Kennedy (D-MA) and in the House by Jim Kolbe (R-AZ), Jeff Flake (R-AZ), and 
Luis Gutierrez (D-IL) 
30-Jun * Rep. Janice Schakowsky (D-IL) introduces the “Immigrant Victims of Violence 
Protection Act of 2005” (H.R. 3188) in the House 
19-July * Bishop Gerald R. Barnes, Chairman of the U.S. Conference of Catholic 
Bishops’ Committee on Migration, issues a statement in support of the “Secure 
America and Orderly Immigration Act of 2005” 
* Rep. Thomas Tancredo (R-CO) introduces the “REAL GUEST Act of 2005” 
(H.R. 3333) in the House 
20-July * “Comprehensive Enforcement and Immigration Reform Act of 2005” (S. 1438) 
is introduced in the Senate by Senators John Cornyn (R-TX) and John Kyl (R-
AZ) 
 14-Oct * “Interfaith Statement in Support of Comprehensive Immigration Reform” is 
signed by 47 national organizations, 90 local organizations, and 45 faith leaders  
25-Oct * Sen. Charles Hagel (R-NE) introduces the “Package of Immigration Reform 
Legislation” (S. 1916 Strengthening America’s Security Act, S. 1917 The 
Employment Verification Act, S. 1918 Strengthening America’s Workforce Act, 
and S. 1919 Immigrant Accountability Act) in the Senate 
6-Dec * “Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 
2005” (H.R. 4437) is introduced in the House by Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner 
(R-WI) 
16-Dec * U.S. House of Representatives passes H.R. 4437, "Border Protection, 
Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005" 
30-Dec * Cardinal Roger M. Mahony of Los Angeles writes a letter to President George 
W. Bush, in which he voices his opposition to H.R. 4437 
  
2006  
8-14 Jan * U.S. Catholic Church's National Migration Week 
14-Jan  * Cardinal Mahony announces the launching of the “Justice for  
Immigrants Campaign – A Journey for Hope” 
23-Jan  * The United States Hispanic Chamber of Commerce (USHCC) unveils 
its principles on immigration reform 
~ 27 ~ 
 
22-Feb  * Rally in Fort Myers, FL with 1,000 participants 
24-Feb  * Chairman Arlen Specter (R-PA) introduces his “Chairman’s Mark” in  
the Senate 
1-Mar * Cardinal Mahony states publicly that he will instruct his priests and faithful lay 
Catholics to disobey the H.R. 4437 if it becomes law 
6-Mar  * Rally in Washington D.C. with 30,000 participants 
10-Mar * Rally in Chicago, IL with 100,000-300,000 participants 
3/11-4/7 * Rallies expand to 76 cities with an estimated mobilization of 500,000 - 900,000 
persons 
16-Mar * “Securing America’s Borders Act” (S. 2454) is introduced in the Senate by Sen. 
Bill Frist (R-TN) 
21-Mar * Cardinal Edward M. Egan of New York City speaks out about the “need to 
extend to new arrivals the understanding and opportunities that were extended to 
others in the past" 
23-Mar * Rally in Milwaukee, WI with 10,000-30,000 participants 
24-Mar * Rallies in the following cities: 
Atlanta, GA with 80,000 participants 
Los Angeles, CA with 2,700 participants 
Phoenix, AZ with 20,000-25,000 participants 
25-Mar * Rallies in the following cities: 
  Dallas, TX with 1,500 participants 
Denver, CO with 50,000 participants 
Houston, TX with 6,000 participants 
Los Angeles, CA with 200,000-500,000 participants 
New York City, NY with 200 participants 
26-Mar * Rallies in the following cities: 
 Dallas, TX with 1,500 participants 
Los Angeles, CA with 3,500 participants 
New York City, NY with 1,000 participants 
San Francisco, CA with 5,000 participants 
27-Mar * Rallies in the following cities: 
Boston, MA with 2,500 participants 
Dallas, TX with 1,500-4,000 participants 
Detroit, MI with 50,000 participants 
Houston, TX with 1,000 participants 
Los Angeles, CA with 8,500-36,500 participants 
Phoenix, AZ with 400 participants 
San Diego, CA with 1,500-2,000 participants 
Washington D.C. with 1,000 participants 
27-Mar * The Senate Judiciary Committee completes the markup of Chairman Arlen 
Specter’s (R-PA) proposed immigration legislation 
28-Mar * Rallies in the following cities: 
 Dallas, TX with 3,000-4,000 participants 
Los Angeles, CA with 6,000 participants 
Phoenix, AZ with 2,000 participants 
San Diego, CA with 1,500-2,000 participants 
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29-Mar * Rallies in the following cities: 
Nashville, TN with 9,000-15,000 participants 
San Diego, CA with 1,500-2,000 participants 
30-Mar * Rally in San Diego, CA with 1,500-2,000 participants 
  * A survey by the Pew Hispanic Center reports that “among white  
Evangelical Protestants, 64% see immigrants as a burden, compared with 56% of 
white Catholics and 52% of white mainline Protestants. There are also differences 
according to political ideologies, with 58% of conservatives seeing immigrants as 
a burden, compared with 42% of liberals and 52% of moderates who feel this 
way.”  
31-Mar * Rallies in the following cities: 
Fresno, CA with 50 participants 
Los Angeles, CA with 100 participants 
San Diego, CA with 1,500-2,000 participants 
1-Apr * Rally in New York City, NY with 4,000-10,000 participants 
5-Apr * Rally in Fresno, CA with 150 participants 
6-Apr * Rally in S. Los Angeles with 100-900 participants 
7-Apr * Sen. Arlen Specter (R-PA) introduces the “Comprehensive Immigration Reform 
Act of 2006” (S. 2611) in the Senate, this bill will be passed after several 
amendments until May 25 
8-10 Apr * A number between 1.4 and 1.7 million people take to the streets in 108 
localities, among the most important: 
9-Apr * Rallies in the following cities: 
Dallas, TX with 350,000-500,000 participants 
Detroit, MI with 100 participants 
 Orlando, FL with 2,000 participants 
Salem, OR with 5,000-10,000 participants 
Salt Lake City, UT with 20,000 participants 
San Diego, CA with 50,000 participants 
St. Paul, MN with 30,000 participants 
10-Apr * Rallies in the following cities: 
 Austin, TX with 10,000 participants 
Atlanta, GA with 40,000-50,000 participants 
Bakersfield, CA with 10,000 participants 
Boston, MA with 10,000 participants 
Denver, CO with 7,000-10,000 participants 
Detroit, MI with 20,000 participants 
Fort Myers, FL with 75,000 participants 
Fresno, CA with 12,000 participants 
Houston, TX with 50,000 participants 
Indianapolis, IN with 10,000 participants 
Los Angeles, CA with 10,000 participants 
Madison, WI with 10,000 participants 
New York City, NY with 100,000 participants 
Oakland, CA with 5,000 participants 
Omaha, NE with 8,000-10,000 participants 
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Phoenix, AZ with 100,000-250,000 participants 
Salem, OR with 10,000 participants 
Salt Lake City, UT with 20,000 participants 
San Antonio, TX with 18,000 participants 
San Jose, CA with 25,000 participants 
Seattle, WA with 25,000 participants 
St. Paul, MN with 30,000 participants 
Washington D.C. with 180,000 participants 
10-30 April * Several organizations across the country make a call for a national economic 
boycott and rallies for May 1 
16-Apr * Cardinal Mahony asks people to devote time on May 1 to understanding the 
“dignity of work, the value of education, and the important role immigrants play,” 
rather than supporting the boycott or missing their work to attend rallies 
19-Apr * Rally in Denver, CO with 1,000 participants 
20-Apr * The Department of Homeland Security arrests seven managers and 1,187 illegal 
immigrants from IFCO Systems North American in 26 states  
22-Apr * President Bush states that “massive deportation of the people here is unrealistic” 
and that “it’s not going to work” 
23-Apr * Rally in San Francisco with 2,000 participants 
26-Apr * Senate approves amendment providing $1.9 billion for upgrades to border-
security equipment 
28-Apr  * Cardinal Roger Mahony of Los Angeles, Cardinal Sean Patrick  
O’Malley of Boston, and Cardinal Theodore E. McCarrick of Washington D.C. 
lobby on Capitol Hill in order to push for immigration reform and call for 
immigrants to ignore plans for a nationwide day of walkouts 
* President Bush asks immigrants to reject work boycotts  
29-Apr  * In Chicago, Rev. Jesse Jackson and his Rainbow Coalition pledge to  
participate in the national boycott 
* In accordance to the Los Angeles Times, “In Los Angeles, some African 
American community leaders, Korean American churches and businesses, 
Filipino workers, South Asian immigrants, Jews and Muslims have all announced 
their intent to march on May 1” 
* Senator John McCain (R-AZ) announces that he does not think the boycott will 
help and that it may have a negative impact on the cause 
1-May  * An estimated 1.2 - 2 million people participate in organized rallies associated to 
an economic boycott in 63 localities across the U.S., among the most important: 
Atlanta, GA with 4,500 participants 
Bakersfield, CA with 3,000 participants 
Chicago, IL with 400,000-750,000 participants 
Denver, CO with 50,000-75,000 participants 
Detroit, MI with 1,000 participants 
Fresno, CA with 15,000 participants 
Houston, TX with 10,000-15,000 participants 
Los Angeles, CA with 400,000-700,000 participants 
Madison, WI with 3,000 participants 
Milwaukee, WI with 10,000-70,000 participants 
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New York City, NY with 3,000 participants 
Oakland, CA with 15,000-17,000 participants 
Orlando, FL with 20,000 participants 
Phoenix, AZ with 2,400 participants 
Salem, OR with 8,000 participants 
Salinas, CA with 13,000 participants 
San Antonio, TX with 18,000 participants 
San Diego, CA with 2,500 participants 
San Francisco, CA with 30,000 participants 
San Jose, CA with 100,000 participants 
Seattle, WA with 10,000-65,000 participants 
* Senator Lamar Alexander (R-TN) introduces a resolution declaring that the 
national anthem should only be sung in English 
2-May  * Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) states that the boycotts were ill- 
advised, yet they were largely peaceful and he was inspired by the heartfelt nature 
of the demonstrations 
* Rep. Bill Frist (R-TN) says that attempts at a reconciliation would focus on 
“border security first and foremost.” He also says that “we don’t know who the 
[illegal immigrants] are. They’re in the shadows and we need to devise a plan to 
bring them out of the shadows, short of amnesty, but treats them in a fair and 
compassionate way.” 
3-May  * Rep. Russell K. Pearce (R-AZ) states that he is “fed up” with his own  
party’s management of the immigration issue and that Washington is “ducking its 
responsibility” 
8-May  * Lockheed Martin Information Technology is awarded a $120 million,  
five-year contract with the Department of Homeland Security in order to set up 
new immigration-information call centers 
11-May * Senate leaders announce an agreement to resume the debate on immigration 
legislation 
12-May * Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) urges President Bush to get involved in 
the Senate legislation 
15-May * Bishop Gerald Richard Barnes of San Bernardino (CA) releases a statement, 
prior to President Bush’s public address, supporting comprehensive immigration 
reform and stating that an enforcement-only approach will not solve the illegal 
immigration problem 
 * Gov. Janet Napolitano (D) of Arizona and Gov. Rick Perry (R) of Texas support 
Bush’s initiative to send National Guard troops to the border while Gov. Arnold 
Schwarzenegger (R) of California and Gov. Bill Richardson (D) of New Mexico 
express concern 
* President Bush addresses the nation and calls for Congress to pass 
comprehensive immigration reform that strengthens border security by sending 
6,000 National Guard troops to the border, enforces immigration laws, and 
includes a guest-worker program 
* Based on information from the Department of Homeland Security, 
the Star Telegram (Forth Worth, Texas) reports that “under President Bush, the 
U.S. has already deported more people than under any other president in U.S. 
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history.” The Bush administration has already deported 881,478 and it is likely 
that they will be the first to deport more than 1 million people. 
16-May * The Senate refuses to remove a guest-worker program from legislation, yet an 
amendment passes to reduce the number of yearly visas available to foreign 
workers from 325,000 down to 200,000 
17-May * The Senate approves the construction of 370 miles of fencing along the U.S.-
Mexico border that will cost at least $1 billion 
* Senate passes an amendment that will tighten restrictions in the temporary 
worker program 
* About 400 church, union and civic leaders meet with elected officials on Capitol 
Hill to press for legalization of all immigrants and express opposition to current 
proposals 
18-May * Senate passes amendments declaring English the “national” language and also 
the “common and unifying” language of the U.S.  
22-May * Senate approves an amendment by Sen. John Ensign (R-NV) that sets 
parameters for the use of the 6,000 National Guard troops in support of the Border 
Patrol 
25-May * The Senate passes the “Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006” (S. 
2611) 
1-Jun  * Texas Governor Rick Perry (R) announces his plan to implement a  
border-patrol program by using $5 million to set up hundreds of internet-
connected surveillance cameras along the Texas-Mexico border 
3-Jun  * 17 Canadian residents are arrested on charges of plotting a terrorist  
bombing attack which raises new U.S. fears that the next terrorist attack could 
come from the north 
6-Jun  * Some 55 soldiers from the Utah National Guard are the first to take up  
positions along the U.S.-Mexico border 
7-Jun  * About 2,300 Texas National Guard troops are deployed to the state’s  
southern border 
19-Jun * The Independent Institute releases its “Open Letter on Immigration,” reminding 
President Bush and Congress of the benefits of immigration. The letter is signed 
by more than five hundred economists, including five Nobel Laureates 
20-Jun * In an unusual decision, House Republican leaders announce that they will hold 
summer hearings around the nation on immigration policy. Usually, the two 
chambers would go to conference committee to work out differences in the two 
immigration bills (H.R. 4437 and S. 2611)  
* The new commissioner of Customs and Border Protection, W. Ralph Basham, 
states that he does not favor building a wall along the Mexican border, “it doesn’t 
make sense, it’s not practical” 
22-Jun  * The U.S. Senate announces its own immigration hearings 
29-Jun * A report by the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights suggests 
that the impact of new citizens and the U.S.-born children of immigrants on the 
2008 election can be significant at a national level and in the following states: 
Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin  
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3-Jul The National Conference of State Legislatures announces that over 500 pieces of 
legislation addressing immigrant issues have been introduced in more than 42 
state legislatures in the United States in 2006. For the same year at least 57 bills 
on the matter have been enacted in 27 states, which represent an increase of more 
than 50 percent on similar bills approved on 2005 
5-Jul * In accordance to the New York Times, President Bush switches his original 
position of supporting a comprehensive immigration reform and is now open to an 
“enforcement-first approach that would put new border security programs in place 
before creating a guest worker program or path to citizenship for people living in 
the U.S. illegally” 
13-Jul * The Senate approves the Homeland Security bill. The $32.8 billion bill includes 
money for additional law enforcement agents and more beds in detention centers 
to facilitate the deportation of unauthorized immigrants 
 * In accordance to the 2006 National Survey of Latinos, the Pew Hispanic Center 
asserts that “more than half of Latinos surveyed say they see an increase in 
discrimination as a result of the [immigration] policy debate, and three-quarters 
say the debate will prompt many more Latinos to vote in November. Almost two-
thirds think the pro-immigrant marches this year signal the beginning of a new 
and lasting social movement” 
14-Jul * The mayor of Hazleton (PA) signs a city ordinance that, among other provisions 
against unauthorized immigrants, fines landlords $1,000 per day for each 
unauthorized immigrant living on their properties. Hispanic immigrants make up 
about one-third of the town’s 31,000 population 
19-Jul  * In Chicago, about 10,000 persons attend a pro-immigrant rights rally 
25-Jul * A poll by the Tarrance Group shows that 71 percent of Americans agree with a 
solution to immigration issues that includes border security, a guest worker 
program, and a pathway to citizenship 
* Sen. Kay B. Hutchison (R-TX) and Rep. Mike Pence (R-IN) announce a 
proposal that, after securing the borders first, would require certain unauthorized 
immigrants (citizens of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the 
Central American Free Trade Agreement – Dominican Republic) to leave the 
country to apply for a temporary worker Good Neighbor SAFE (Secure 
Authorized Foreign Employee) visa, which could be renewed for five periods of 2 
years each. The process itself could represent a 30 year-wait for eligible 
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